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Key Points
t International linkage of regional, national, and subnational climate poli-
cies could play an important role in supporting the ramp up of ambition in 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) over time and so contrib-
ute to the success of the Paris Agreement.
t Linkage has the potential to lower overall costs of mitigation, given the 
wide range of marginal abatement costs across countries, and also can lower 
administrative costs of compliance and help build political momentum, 
both of which can contribute to scaling up ambition.
t he bottom-up nature of the Paris Agreement has led to great heterogene-
ity of NDCs, which can pose challenges for linking. hese challenges are 
not insurmountable, but will require thoughtful guidance for the efective 
operation of key provisions for linking in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.
t Article 6 guidance can facilitate linkage by, among other things, provid-
ing clear deinitions and principles for internationally transferred mitiga-
tion outcomes (ITMOs), taking into account the heterogeneous nature of 
NDCs.
he Paris Agreement features a hybrid policy architecture, combining top-down elements 
for monitoring, reporting, and veriication, and bottom-up elements, including NDCs.1 he 
Agreement has achieved a key necessary condition for ultimate success, namely adequate scope 
of participation, with participating nations accounting for approximately 97 percent of global 
GHG emissions.
1 he arguments in this brief are developed more fully in Mehling, et al. (2017). Citations to the relevant literature are provided 
there.
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he other key necessary condition for ultimate success of this new approach is adequate, 
collective ambition of the individual NDCs to put the world on a path toward achieving the 
global political target of limiting temperature increases to 2° C. A central question is how to 
provide a structure and/or incentives that will facilitate such increases in ambition over time. 
International linkage of regional, national, and subnational policies can be part of the answer.
A challenge is the substantial degree of heterogeneity that characterizes climate policies along 
three dimensions: types of policy instruments, levels of political jurisdictions implementing 
those policies, and types of targets. Our research examines such heterogeneity and identiies 
(a) which linkages are feasible; (b) of these, which are most promising; and (c) what account-
ing mechanisms would make their operation consistent with the Paris Agreement.
Why focus on linkage?
he major economic argument for linkage is cost efectiveness — the ability to achieve a given 
level of emission reductions at lowest cost. Since a major impediment to ambitious climate 
policy is concern about the cost of mitigation, any policy that can lower costs can also lower 
political resistance to ambitious policy. It has been estimated that international linkage could 
reduce the cost of achieving the emissions reductions speciied in the initial set of NDCs 
under the Paris Agreement by 32 percent by 2030 and by 54 percent by 2050 (World Bank 
2016, 83, 86).
Linkage can be valuable even when the linking jurisdictions have similar carbon prices. Here 
the beneits are political and administrative rather than economic. he political beneits from 
linking policies may stem from providing a sense of momentum to which political supporters 
of climate policy can point and so build support. Since GHG emissions are a global pollut-
ant, no politician wants to appear to be acting unilaterally to control emissions. Linking with 
other jurisdictions is a tangible signal of a multilateral approach to the problem. here are 
also administrative economies of scale through linkage. Jurisdictions can share best practices 
in designing and operating emission control policies and so learn from each other. hey can 
also share administrative and oversight costs and avoid costly duplication of control eforts.
Linkage and heterogeneous systems
he bottom-up nature of the Paris Agreement has led to great heterogeneity in the submit-
ted NDCs. In addition, it is important to consider the possible role of non-party states and 
subnational governments in the wake of the Trump election in the United States and the 
announced intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. We separate these heterogeneous 
attributes into three categories: policy instrument, political jurisdiction, and target. We divide 
our consideration of political jurisdiction into two types of heterogeneity: levels of govern-
ment engaged in the prospective linkage (regional, national, or subnational) and status under 
the Paris Agreement (Party or non-Party). Finally we focus on two types of target heterogene-
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ity: the type of policy-instrument target and the type of NDC target. Our research suggests 
that heterogeneity per se is not an impediment to linkage. But there is a role for guidance on 
the key provision in the Paris Agreement for linking—Article 6.2.
Priorities for effective Article 6 guidance
Guidance elaborated by the Parties should direct attention to those potential transfers that 
present meaningful risks to environmental integrity. his would include the potential for “hot 
air,” consideration of heterogeneous target types, difering base years among linking parties, 
and diferences in degree of geographic coverage of NDCs and the resulting potential for leak-
age, among other factors.
Key issues when accounting for international transfers facilitated through Article 6 include: 
quantifying mitigation targets and outcomes; avoiding double-counting of emission reduc-
tions; and accommodating diferent metrics for, and vintages of, targets and outcomes.
In order to track and account for international transfers through Article 6.2, deinitions, prin-
ciples, and accounting rules will be needed. Among the approaches that could be speciied 
in guidance on Article 6 are: standards and procedures for quantifying mitigation outcomes 
(whether through carbon taxes, cap-and-trade instruments, performance standards, or other 
policy instruments); registry tracking of the transfer and use of ITMOs; guidance on NDC 
elements that would increase clarity; and guidance to move NDCs to greater consistency, such 
as with regard to assumed Global Warming Potential values. Guidance could also establish 
whether and how transfers to or from non-Parties (or subnational jurisdictions therein) can 
be accounted for.
Guidance on Article 6 also needs to focus on the nature and scope of ITMOs. One issue is the 
metric for ITMOs: Will there be a single common metric, presumably tons of CO
2
 equiva-
lent, or will there be multiple metrics, such as installed capacity of renewable power? his 
relates to a broader question of whether ITMOs will be, in efect, a single or multiple type of 
compliance unit.
As they negotiate the work program on implementation of the Paris Agreement, Parties have 
an opportunity to establish clear and consistent guidance for operationalizing Article 6. If 
they can set aside political diferences and agree on a robust framework for ITMO transfers, 
they will not only avoid impeding future linkage of climate policies across jurisdictions, but 
could create an enabling context with common deinitions and modalities. Such a harmonized 
set of parameters could help accelerate linkage and allow for broader and deeper cooperation. 
It could also enhance Parties’ ability to scale up the ambition of their NDCs and potentially 
foster constructive engagement between Parties and non-Parties, as well as subnational juris-
dictions.
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